GEOPOLITICS OP-ED OP-ED: The pros and cons of South Africa’s BRICS-driven foreign policy and trade focus

With traditional elections looming, South Africa’s political parties appear divided over the nation’s foreign policy direction. The main opposition party, the Democratic Alliance (DA), has expressed concern over the admission of additional members to BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa), stressing that the new member states appear authoritarian.

The DA considers only three BRICS members to be democracies: South Africa, India and Brazil.

Similarly, ActionSA openly disapproves of South Africa’s relations with BRICS member states. Its leader, Herman Mashaba, urged American lawmakers in June 2023 not to punish South Africa due to the ruling African National Congress (ANC) government’s decision to side with what he perceives to be the wrong side of history.

The Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF), on the other hand, has consistently expressed support for BRICS, with the party’s leader, Julius Malema, welcoming the addition of new members, viewing the bloc as born out of a need for cooperation rather than exploitation, which is how the EFF typically characterises relations with the West.

With a BRICS summit scheduled for Kazan, Russia, in October 2024, it is necessary to take stock of Pretoria’s engagement with the grouping.

Like other BRICS members, post-apartheid South Africa has historically been sceptical of Western dominance in global security and economic governance institutions such as the UN Security Council, the World Trade Organisation, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.

While China is Pretoria’s largest trading partner at R17 billion, accounting for 11.9% of its exports and at R31 billion accounting for 20.3% of its imports in January 2024, South Africa continues to strengthen its ties with the European Union – of which Pretoria is one of a dozen global strategic partners, and the sole African partner – as well as with various Western multilateral bodies and the US.

The importance of BRICS to Pretoria lies essentially in the country’s desire to balance its relations with Western powers through collective lobbying by states across the grouping.

In this regard, three identifiable alternatives accompany South Africa’s membership of BRICS. First, the community’s focus on trade without interference in domestic affairs is part of the partnership terms. This enables its 10 members some independence in conducting their trade goals without the need for collective approval or judgement.

2nd, an extremely important aspect of South Africa’s BRICS membership is the opportunity to diversify trade between Pretoria and various member states and to focus on manufacturing goods for exports rather than exporting raw materials.

South Africa’s exports to countries throughout the bloc grew by 7.1% between 2016 and 2022, with China being the largest contributor to this growth.

Furthermore, 21% of Pretoria’s trade with the world was conducted within the BRICS bloc, with China accounting for 67%, India 26.8%, Brazil 4.1% and Russia 1.6%.

This makes each and every BRICS member a large trading partner for South Africa, as this effect bigger in commerce represents a fundamental boost in local industries as well, albeit tilted toward imports rather than exports.

BRICS+

Third, following South Africa’s entry into BRICS in 2010, varied African worldwide locations additionally expressed interest in becoming a member of the community. All throughout the 15th BRICS summit held in Johannesburg in August 2023, 5 original worldwide locations had been officially licensed to affix the bloc, which became once then renamed BRICS+.

Among the new countries were Egypt and Ethiopia, as well as various developing countries including Iran, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.

As well as, 20 other countries requested to join BRICS in 2022. Fourteen submitted formal applications, including Algeria, Democratic Republic of the Congo and Gabon.

Individuals from BRICS could help South Africa diversify its trading partners, as the country seeks to reduce its reliance on China, the EU, and the US for trade.

New members also provide Pretoria with more opportunities to engage diplomatically to push for the reform of institutions of global economic governance such as the WTO, the World Bank and the IMF.

South Africa has been vocal about its broad aim to urge the bloc to advance Africa’s interests, such as reform of global governance institutions, global trade and the work of the G20.

However, there are no clear or detailed recommendations for achieving this aim.

The lack of explicit goals regarding Pretoria’s interest in promoting African interests within the bloc is evident in the dealings of individual BRICS members with African states that do not necessarily prioritise the continent’s need for infrastructure, development, regional integration and industrialisation. Intra-African trade was a mere 14% in 2023.

Although South Africa is widely regarded as the bloc’s gateway to Africa, there is some scepticism as to whether other African countries recognise it as such.

A second weakness is the absence of concrete economic benefits for South Africa from its BRICS membership, despite the growth in trade among members over the past 15 years. The increase in intra-BRICS trade is largely due to the rapid economic growth of individual members, which may not be linked to any specific BRICS mechanism.

One driver of this growth has been Moscow’s increased trade with China and India following Western economic sanctions in the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.

Furthermore, South Africa’s trade with its BRICS partners is tilted toward China at 67% – making Beijing Pretoria’s top trading partner within and outside the bloc.

Lastly, the interest-based global politics of BRICS members are further exacerbated by ongoing rivalries that hinder cooperation across the bloc.

Russia’s need for a unified BRICS currency due to American sanctions following its invasion of Ukraine is also shared by some of the bloc’s members such as Beijing and New Delhi. Pretoria, on the other hand, sees a unified currency as economically unfeasible.

This interest-based politics is also tied to the fact that the Global South contains geographically dispersed member states that share little historical background, culture, and/or language. This has contributed to the absence of collective decision-making and a lack of a coordinated BRICS secretariat. DM

Dr Samuel Igba is a post-doctoral Research Fellow at the University of Pretoria’s Centre for the Advancement of Scholarship.